'Based on a long common law history and once an important measure in sales contracts, s.13 Sale of Goods Act 1979 has now become unnecessary and irrelevant.’\r'

'Introduction \r\n segmentation 13 of the barter of Goods symbolise 1979 was previously considered an important measure in sales contracts. It at one time appears remote and unnecessary and wherefore in need of abandonment.This essay will question why s.13 is no longer relevant by analysing its flaws and demonstrating how the requirement that ‘goods must take on their commentary’ screw be enforced elsewhere.\r\nOverview of role 13 sales agreement of Goods Act 1979\r\nSection 13 of the Sale of Goods Act (SGA) 1979 states that where there is a contract for the sale of goods by verbal translation, there exists an implied term that the goods will correspond with that rendering. This slit only applies to goods that ar sold by their description only. If the buyer has the chance to see the goods before qualification their purchase, then this section plentynot be relied upon. An example of this drop be seen in the case of Harlingdon & Leinster v Christophe r take away o.k. Art [1991] 1 QB 564 where goods were described as a Gabrielle Munter painting in an auction catalogue. some(prenominal) the buyers and traffickers were London art dealers, yet the sellers were not experts in German paintings whilst the buyers were. The buyers also sent there experts to scrutinise the painting before agreeing to purchase the painting for ?6000. The buyers desire to rely on s.13 when it was found that the painting was a fake, but it was held that the sale was not by description because an expert had been sent to inspect the painting. This indicates that purge if goods are originally creation sold by description, erst a buyer has had the opportunity to inspect the goods they can no longer seek protective cover low s.13.\r\nRejection of Goods not Matching Exact Description\r\nIn Arcos v Ranaason [1933] AC 470 it was demonstrated that the duty of the seller is extremely strict (Atiya et al; 2010: 154). Here, a buyer was entitled to hold out goods that were described as being 1/2 an inch thick on the basis that some of them were slightly less than this. dismantle though the quality of the goods was not affected, it was said that the goods were not as described and could therefore be rejected. This is in all likelihood to cause many problems as the purchaser in the Arcos case had simply changed his mind about purchase the goods and then seek to rely on s.13 to reject them even though the description did not stay fresh him from using the goods for their intended purpose. As s.13 is narrowly see, it is undetermined of being used in circumstances that would come along inappropriate. In Re Moore & Landauer [1921] 2 KB 519 it was held that the purchaser was entitled to reject goods that were described as being packed in cases of 30 when they were packed in cases of 24. This was despite the fact that the overall number of goods was correct. Arguably, s.13 is interpreted very strictly and a slight exit from th e description of the goods will be enough for a purchaser to reject them.\r\nNarrow Interpretation of Section 13\r\nAs pointed out by the part of Business Innovation and Skills; â€Å"Description takes on a very narrow meaning, referring only to the commercial characteristics of the goods” (BIS, 2010: 24). Statements that fall in been made about the goods, or aspects of the specification of the goods are not covered by s.13, illustrating it’s unpermissiveness (Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v Christopher Hill Ltd. [1971] 1 All ER 847). This section also appears to conflict with the European wedding Directive 99/44/EC which provides that the â€Å"description” of goods will also include the â€Å"description minded(p) by the seller”. The Directive thus appears to hide a wider range of characteristics, thereby providing extra protection to the sale of goods. Sections 3, 8, 11C and 11I of the bestow of Goods and Services Act (SGSA) 1982 and s.9 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act (SG(IT)A) 1973 also have identical provision to s.13. Because of this, it is questionable why s.13 is needed given that its coat is extremely rigid. The requirement that goods must match their description can be found in opposite pieces of legislation, thus demonstrating that s.13 is no longer necessary or relevant.\r\nSection 13 Unnecessary and Irrelevant\r\nSection 13 was originally only supposed to put through to commercial sales of unascertained or future goods (Brown, 1990: 561). In such instances, a description of the goods would have been a necessary requisite which sellers would have provided to purchasers before a sales contract was entered into (Sealey and Hooley, 2008: 401). Since the Harlingdon & Leinster case, however, it seems as though s.13 is now being applied to sales of specific goods. trustfulness upon description is not an essential ingredient, which is unjustifiable in that contracts can be rescinded in circumstances which they would not otherwise have been. The parties will also be required to demonstrate that they intended for the description to be a term of the contract if they want to check a breach of contract; Drake v Thos Agnew & Sons Ltd [2002] EWHC 294 (QB). Consequently, s.13 is no longer relevant in the 21st coke as protection can be sought against wrongly described goods through other provisions.\r\n closing\r\nOverall, it seems as though s.13 is in fact irrelevant and unnecessary in the 21st Century. Whilst it was previously survey to be an important component is contract sales, it is no longer required as a go away of superseding legislation and because of its narrow interpretation by the courts. It could be argued that s.13 therefore needs abandoning as it seems to prevent purchasers from rescinding a contract if they had a chance to inspect goods even if they were later found to be fraudulent. This is largely foul as a fraudulent painting whitethorn not be easily identifiabl e at low gear and may require a more(prenominal) thorough inspection which could not be achieved without first making a purchase. Whilst goods must always match their description, goods which fail to do so will be protected through other legislative provisions. As such, s. 13 is no longer needed and does not seem as relevant as it erst was.\r\nReferences \r\nAtiya, P. S. Adams, J. and Macqueen, L H. (2010) Atiya’s Sale of Goods, Pearson Education, 12th Edition.\r\nBrown, I. (1990) ‘Forgery, Fine Art and the Sale of Goods’ law Quarterly Review, 561-564.\r\n plane section for Business Innovation & Skills. (2010) ‘Consolidation and Simplification of UK Consumer Law’ BIS, accessed 08 December 2014.\r\nSealey, L. S. and Hooley, R. J. A. (2008) Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Ma terials, OUP Oxford, fourth Edition.\r\nCase Law \r\nArcos v Ranaason [1933] AC 470\r\nAshington Piggeries Ltd. v Christopher Hill Ltd. [1971] 1 All ER 847\r\nDrake v Th os Agnew & Sons Ltd [2002] EWHC 294 (QB)\r\nHarlingdon & Leinster v Christopher Hull Fine Art [1991] 1 QB 564\r\nRe Moore & Landauer [1921] 2 KB 519.\r\n'